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هلخص
ٍِ تتطية ٍحطاخ اىق٘ي اىْ٘ٗيح ٗاىصْاعح اىْ٘ٗيح ٗمزىل صْاعح اىفضاء ٍست٘ي عاىي حذا ٍِ األٍاُ ىزىل
 ىزىل يجة أخز.اىضشٗسي عَو تقييٌ ىيَخاطش ىٖزٓ اىَْظٍ٘اخ ماٍيح ٗ األّظَح اىفشعيح اىتي تٖا ٗ ٍنّ٘اخ تيل األّظَح
ٗ  ٗعَو تقييٌ مَي ٗ سقَي ىحساب االتاحيح ىٖزٓ األّظَح,في االعتثاس تياّاخ ٍعذه اّٖياس اىَنّ٘اخ ٗ احتَاالخ حذٗثٖا
ٓرىل تاستخذاً شجشج تحييو األخطاء ىْظاً تغزيح ٍيآ اإلضافي اىزي يَذ ٍ٘ىذ اىثخاس تاىَيآ أثْاء حادثح فقذ ّظاً تغزيح اىَيا
 حيث ْٕاك ّظاٍيِ ٍت٘اصييِ ٍْفصييِ ىَ٘ىذ اىثخاس,اىشئيسي أٗ اّقطاع اىطاقح اىنٖشتائيح عِ ّظاً تغزيح اىَيآ اإلضافي
. %011 اى٘احذ مو ّظاً ىٔ قذسج تصو إىي
ت٘ضح اىْتائج اىتقييٌ اىنَي ىْظاً تغزيح اىَيآ اإلضافي ٗ مزىل اىتقييٌ اىشقَي ىيْظاً ٗرىل تاستخذاً تياّاخ ٍعذه
7651  مَا ت٘ضح اىذساسح عذً اإلتاجيح ىنو عْصش في اىْظاً ٗ مزىل عذً إتاحيح اىْظاً منو عيي ٍذاس,إّٖياس اىَنّ٘اخ
 ّٗ٘صي تإجشاء دٗساخ االختثاساخ ٗ اىصياّح في اىَ٘عذ اىَحذد ىٖا, ً ىيتٌ اىتامذ ٍِ إتاحيح اىْظاً عيي ٍذاس اىعا.ساعح
.تَاٍا

Abstract
Nuclear power plant, nuclear industry and aerospace industry require a high level of safety so it is
necessary to make risk assessment for these systems, subsystems and components. So, it is needed to take into
consideration the components failure rate and its probability, and have qualitative and quantitative evaluation
using fault tree analysis. The conducted study is aiming to make qualitative and quantitative evaluation for
Auxiliary Feed Water system (AFWS) which is designed to supply feed water to the steam generators for
Reactor Coolant System (RCS) heat removal in a case of loss of main feed water or loss of all AC (alternating
current) power to the station auxiliary, (AFWS) consisted of two trains to single steam generator which achieve
100% capacity for each train, Complete redundancy and diversity achieved.
Results show the qualitative evaluation of auxiliary feed water system, this qualitative assessment is
supported by failure rate data of components to have quantitative evaluation, this study indicated the
unavailability of the individual components and the total unavailability of the (AFWS) for 8760 hour. To be sure
that the system is available during operation periods, test and repair periods must be obtain at its exact scheduled
time.

Nomenclature
A
AC
AFWS
CSS
F
IRWST
LOCA
MDT
MTBF

Availability
Alternating current
Auxiliary feed water system
Containment spray system
Unreliability
In-containment refueling water
storage tank
Loss of coolant accident
Mean down time
Mean time between failure
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MTTF
N
NF
q
R
RCS
SIS
t
U
λ

mean time to fail
Number of items
Number of failures
Unavailability
Reliability
Reactor coolant system
safety injection system
Time
TD Down time Unavailability
Failure rate
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1 Introduction
1.1 Description of (PWR)
Nuclear power plants play an
important role in facing the increasing
demand of electrical power. For a nuclear
power plant to perform the function of
generating electricity, many different
systems must perform their functions.
These functions may range from the
monitoring of a plant parameter to the
controlling of the main turbine or the
reactor.
There are two major systems utilized
to convert the heat generated from fuel into
electrical power for industrial and
residential use. The primary system
transfers the heat from the fuel to the steam
generator, where the secondary system

begins. The steam formed in the steam
generator is transferred by the secondary
system to the main turbine generator,
where it is converted into electricity. After
passing through the low pressure turbine,
the steam is routed to the main condenser.
Cool water, flowing through the tubes in
the condenser, removes excess heat from
the steam, which allows the steam to
condense. The water is then pumped back
to the steam generator for reuse.
In order for the primary and
secondary systems to perform their
functions, there are approximately one
hundred support systems. In addition, for
emergencies, there are dedicated systems
to mitigate the consequences of accidents,
see figure 1. [1]

Figure 1 indicates primary loop and secondary loop

1.2 safety systems
The safety systems consist of the
safety injection system (SIS), the incontainment refueling water storage tank
(IRWST),
the
containment
spray
system(CSS), and the auxiliary feed water
system (AFWS) which is located at
auxiliary building, see figure 2.
The AFWS is designed to supply
feed water to the SGs for reactor coolant
system RCS heat removal in a case of loss
of main feed water. In addition, the AFWS
refills the SGs following a LOCA to

minimize leakage through pre-existing
tube leaks, see figure 3. [2]
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Figure 2. Safety systems in nuclear power plant

Figure 3. Auxiliary feed water system and its connection to steam generator

2 Auxiliary Feed
System (AFWS)

Water

The auxiliary feed water system is
designed to supply high-pressure feed
water to the steam generators in order to
maintain a water inventory for removal of
heat energy from the reactor coolant
system by secondary side steam release in
the event of inoperability or unavailability
of the main feed water system and loss of
all AC power to the station auxiliary.

Redundant supplies are provided by
two pumping systems using different
sources of power for the pumps. The
design capacity of each system is set so
that the steam generators will not boil dry
nor will the primary side relieve fluid
through the pressurizer relief valves,
following a loss of main feed water flow
with a reactor trip, See Figure 4.
The AFWS is a system of two
divisions and four trains which supply
water to two steam generator (2 trains to
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steam generator). The reliability of the
AFWS is increased through the use of two
motor-driven pumps, two turbine-driven
pumps, and two independent safety-related
emergency feed water storage tanks
located in the auxiliary building(AFWST).
It consists of two trains to single steam
generator which achieve 100% capacity for
each train. Complete redundancy and
diversity achieved, where division 1 is
parallel with division 2, there is only
orifice which series with the two parallel
divisions.
Major Components per each SG.
 Turbine driven pump 100%
capacity.
 Two check valve.
 Solenoid Globe valve which is
normally open.
 DC motor gate valve which is
normally open.
 Motor driven pump 100% capacity.
The auxiliary feed water system
has no functional requirements during
normal plant operation. It is used during
plant startup and shutdown and during hot
shutdown or hot standby conditions when
chemical additions or small feed water
flow requirements do not warrant the
operation of the main feed water and
condensate systems. During normal plant
operations, the auxiliary feed water system
is maintained in a standby condition ready
to be placed in operation automatically
when conditions require. [3] & [4]

3 Reliability& availability
Reliability (R) is a characteristic of
design. It is defined as the ‘probability that
a specified item will perform a specified
function within a defined environment, for
a specified length of time’. For complex
systems the reliability requirement is
normally specified in terms of the mean
time between failures (MTBF) or as a
failure rate, for example failures per
million operating hours. The unreliability
(F) of item can be defined as the
‘probability of that item may fail to
perform its function, for a specified length
of time’. Both reliability and unreliability
vary with time. Reliability R(t) decreases
with time: an item that has been just tested
and shown to meet specification has
reliability value of 1 when first placed in
service, one year later this may decrease to
0.5. Unreliability F(t) increases with time;
an item that has been just tested and shown
to meet specification has unreliability
value of 0 when first placed in service, one
year later this may increase to 0.5. So the
sum of reliability and unreliability must be
1.see figure 5.

R (t )  e t
R (t )  F (t )  1
F (t )  1  R (t )

Where:
λ=failure rate
t= time
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Figure4. Auxiliary feed water system (AFWS)
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with time as individual item approach end
of design life for product, long life time of
the component which make up the product
are now wear out.

3.1 Non-repairable items

Figure 5. Reliability and unreliability with
constant failure model.

The behavior of failure rates with
time is quite revealing the failure rate
curve
usually
has
the
general
characteristics of a "bathtub" as shown in
Figure 6.

Suppose that N individual items of
given non-repairable product are placed in
service and the times at which failure
occur are recorded during test interval T.
Assuming that N item fail during T and ith
failure occurs at time Ti, which is Ti is
survival time or UP time for the ith failure
as shown in figure 7. The total up time for
N failures is therefore
i N

T
i 1

i

And mean time to failure is given

by:
MTTF 

1
N

i N

T
i 1

i

N

  i N

T
i 1

Figure6. Typical variation in
instantaneous failure rate (hazard rate)
during life time of product “bathtub
curve”.

Figure 4 shows the most general
form of failure rate λ(t) of product through
the life time. Bathtub curve consists of
three regions; burn in, useful life and wear
out failure. The burn in early failure region
where λ(t) decreasing with time. When
items are new, especially if product is new
design, early failure can occur due to
design fault, poor quality component,
manufacturing fault, installation error, and
operating and maintenance error. The
useful life region is characterized by a low
constant failure rate. Here all components
have
been
removed;
design,
manufacturing, installation, operating and
maintenance error rectified so the failure is
due to unpredictable cause. The wear out
region is characterized by λ(t) increasing

i

Mean failure rate is reciprocal of MTTF.
MTTF is the total area under graph.

Figure7. Failure rate of non-repairable
items.


MTTF   R (t )dt
0
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that the given external resources are
provided. [5]

3.2 Repairable items

A

Figure 8. Failure rate of repairable items.

Figure 8 shows the failure pattern for
N repairable items observed over attest
interval T. The down time TDj associated
with jth failure is the total time between
elapses between the occurrence of the
failure and the repair item to be back into
normal operation. The total down time of
Nf failures is therefore ∑
and the
mean down time is given by:

MDT 

1
NF

j N F

T
j 1

Dj

Total up time  NT 

j N F

T
j 1

Dj

 NT  N F MDT

MTBF 

NT  N F * MDT
NF

NF
NT  N F * MDT
Availability of an item/system is the
probability that this item/system will be in
a state to perform a required function
under given conditions, at a given instant
in time or over a time interval, assuming
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MTBF
MTBF  MDT

So the availability depends on
MTBF, that is availability depends on
reliability. Availability can be increased by
increasing MTBF, reducing the mean
failure rate. Also it depends on MDT mean
down time, availability increases by
decreasing MDT, how quickly the product
is repaired and put back into service.

4 Analysis of Auxiliary Feed
Water System by using fault
tree
A fault tree analysis can be simply
described as an analytical technique,
whereby an undesired state of the system
is specified (usually a state that is critical
from a safety standpoint), and the system
is then analyzed in the context of its
environment and operation to find all
credible ways in which the undesired
event can occur. The fault tree itself is a
graphic model of the various parallel and
sequential combinations of faults that will
result in the occurrence of the predefined
undesired event. The faults can be events
that are associated with component
hardware failures, human errors, or any
other pertinent events which can lead to
the undesired event. A fault tree thus
depicts the logical interrelationships of
basic events that lead to the undesired
event-which is the top event of the fault
tree.
It is also important to point out that a
fault tree is not in itself a quantitative
model. It is a qualitative model that can be
evaluated quantitatively and often is. This
qualitative aspect, of course, is true of
virtually all varieties of system models.
The fact that a fault tree is a particularly
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convenient model to quantify does not
change the qualitative nature of the model
itself. [6]
The construction of the fault tree
necessitates a thorough understanding of
the system. The undesired event, called the
"top event" must be carefully defined.
Furthermore, the limit of resolution should
be stated, potential system interfaces
identified and constraints of the analysis
realized.
The primary failure, which is the
failure of a component in an environment
for which it is qualified. A secondary
failure is the failure of a component in an
environment for which it is not qualified.

In other words, the component fails in a
situation which exceeds the conditions for
which it was designed. [7]
Auxiliary feed water system is
located at auxiliary building in nuclear
power plant, this means that high quality at
manufacturing, installing of components.
So secondary failure of components will be
neglected. It is assumed that (AFWS) will
operate nearly one month during a year
720 hr, and the eleven months is in standby
mode. All input data will be in table 1. [8]
& [9]
Complete qualitative fault tree of (AFWS)
is shown in figure 9.

Table 1 indicates all input data of operating and standby failure rate, test interval,operation time and repair
time.
Operating
failure
Rate λ0

Standby
failure
Rate λs

Test
interval
(hr)

Time of
operation
(hr)

Time
of
repair
(hr)

Turbine
Driven
pump

5.70E-05

1.00E-08

240.0

720.0

24.5

Globe
valve

3.50E-06

1.00E-08

240.0

720.0

1.7

Gate
valve

3.00E-07

1.00E-08

240.0

720.0

3.3

Check
valve

2.00E-07

1.00E-08

8760.0

720.0

1.7

Orifice

6.00E-07

1.00E-08

8760.0

720.0

1.5

Motor
Driven
pump

5.60E-05

1.00E-08

240.0

720.0

19

component

symbol
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Figure9. Complete qualitative fault tree of (AFWS)
.
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The function of (AFWS) is to deliver
water to steam generator so the failure of
supplying water is the undesired event
(Top event).
The undesired event (AFWS) is

In order not to supply water there are
two probabilities if any of them occurs it
will lead to top event so we will use OR
GATE. First one that orifice failure to
remain open (plug) OR train1 and train2
not supply water. Figure10.

For train 1 there are five
probabilities if any one of them occurs
leads to failure of train one will analyze by
OR GATE. Failure of turbine driven pump
or, globe valve or, gate valve or, any of
check valves lead to failure of total system,
See figure12.
Analysis of train 2 is the same for
train 1 expect that turbine driven pump is
placed by motor driven pump, See
figure13.
The failure of turbine driven pump
due to (TDP) is fail to operate at normal
condition, or fail to have steam that operate
turbine, see figure14.

Figure 10. Fault tree construction.

Second probability that train1 and 2
fail to supply water to steam generator. See
figure 11.

Figure 11 train1&2 fail to supply water.

Figure14. TDP failure.

The failure of globe valve due to
valve fail to remain open (plug) at normal
condition, or valve left in closed condition
from last test, see figure 15.
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Figure12. The fault tree of train or system 1

Figure13. The fault tree of train or system 2
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the orifice or the failure of the both parallel
system. The failure of division 1 is due to
failure of turbine driven pump, or failure of
globe valve, or failure of gate valve, or
failure of check valves. The same thing for
division 2 the failure of division 2 is due to
failure of motor driven pump, or failure of
globe valve ….etc.
To make quantitative evaluation of
unavailability for (AFWS) it is required to
estimates the unavailability of each
component. Table 2 provides values of q
for components in system.

Figure 15. Globe valve failure.

The failure of gate valve due to valve
fail to remain open (plug) at normal
condition, or valve left in closed condition
from last test, see figure 16.
Figure17. Check valves failure.
Table 2 indicates all unavailability of components.
Symbol

Figure16. Gate valve failure.

The failure of first and second check
valve due to check valve fail to open, see
figure17. [10]

5 Results
At this point, first, a qualitative
assessment of results and then, armed with
some data, a gross quantitative assessment
can be made. Qualitatively, the leading
contributor to the top event is the failure of

component Unavailability

Turbine
driven
pump

4.1*10-2

Globe
valve

2.52*10-3

Gate
valve

2.1*10-4

Check
valve

1.88*10-4

Orifice

4.76*10-4

Motor
driven
pump

4.04*10-2

The unavailability of division 1 is
4.4*10-2 and unavailability of division 2 is
4.33*10-2 , the unavailability of system 1
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and 2 is 1.9*10-3.The unavailability of
(AFWS) equal 2.38*10-3, so the
availability of auxiliary feed water
system(AFWS) is 0.9977 during a year this
number is acceptable.

6 Recommendations
Quality assurance and quality control
must be applied during the stages of,
design,
manufacturing,
installation,
operation and maintenance to be sure that
all of system, subsystem and components
have high reliability and to reduce its
failure rate. To be sure that (AFWS) is
available during operation period this
requires Test and repair periods must be at
exact schedule times.
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